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ABSTRACT
Alleged patent infringers may bring declaratory judgment actions
against patentees when actual controversies exist over infringement or
validity. Such declaratory judgment actions are important strategic
tools because they allow alleged infringers to take initiative and bring
actions, thereby eliminating the risk of doing business without knowing
whether continued product use would constitute infringement.
Declaratory judgment actions also provide alleged infringers an
opportunity to choose the forum in which to bring their suits. In order
to bring such an action, however, there must be an actual controversy
between the parties to establish standing. The United States Supreme
Court’s 2007 decision in MedImmune v. Genentech made it easier
for alleged infringers to obtain declaratory judgments without actually
terminating or breaching license agreements. The Court held that all
circumstances should be considered when determining whether an
actual controversy exists. The United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit, relying on MedImmune, has since considered what
communication between parties is sufficient to establish the existence
of such a controversy. This Article analyzes those decisions, discusses
possible implications, and describes how the Federal Circuit has finally
embraced the “all circumstances” test for determining whether a
sufficient controversy exists to sustain a declaratory judgment action.
*
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INTRODUCTION
Declaratory judgment actions are important tools for alleged
infringers in patent litigation because they resolve uncertainty and
prevent monetary damages from continuing to accrue for infringement. In addition, declaratory judgment actions give alleged infringers
strategic advantages by acting as plaintiff, including the ability to
choose a favorable forum and to enjoy the benefits of primacy and
memorability at trial.1 The issue, however, is whether there is an actual
controversy such that an infringer will have standing to bring an
action for a declaratory judgment.
In 2007, the United States Supreme Court in MedImmune, Inc. v.
Genentech, Inc. abandoned the two-part test traditionally applied when
1

In trial, the plaintiff generally introduces the case (“primacy”) and delivers the
closing statement (“memorability” or “recency”). Primacy and memorability put
plaintiffs in a better position to convince judges or juries.

2010]

NEUTRALIZING ACTUAL CONTROVERSY

95

determining if a party has standing to bring a declaratory judgment
action—showing (1) a reasonable basis for believing the infringer will be
sued and (2) meaningful preparation to infringe.2 Instead the Court
adopted a new “all circumstances” test that eliminated the first prong
and made it easier to obtain declaratory relief in patent cases.
However, confusion resulted when the Federal Circuit failed to
consistently apply the new test and instead considered certain elements
of the two-part test from time to time.
Two years after MedImmune, in Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Acceleron
LLC,3 the Federal Circuit eliminated some of that confusion when it
followed the “all circumstances” test to determine whether an alleged
infringer had standing to bring a declaratory judgment action. The
Hewlett-Packard case is important not only because it confirms that the
Federal Circuit follows the “all circumstances” test set out in MedImmune, but also because it sheds light on the trend that the Federal
Circuit treats patent-holding companies differently from patentees who
actually use their patents.
I. DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS IN PATENT DISPUTES
The Declaratory Judgment Act4 authorized federal courts to
provide legal remedies to interested parties who have an “actual
controversy” within the meaning of Article III of the U.S. Constitution.5 Congress intended declaratory relief as an alternative to
injunction in cases where injunctive relief is unavailable.6 The
objectives of the Declaratory Judgment Act are (1) to avoid accrual of
avoidable damages to those who are not certain of their rights, (2) to
afford early adjudication without waiting until the adversary decides to
bring a patent infringement lawsuit, and (3) to clarify legal relationships before they have been disturbed or a party’s rights have been

2
3
4
5
6

MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118 (2007).
Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Acceleron LLC, 587 F.3d 1358, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 (2006).
U.S. Const., art. III, § 2.
Steffel v. Thompson, 415 U.S. 452 (1974).
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violated.7
Courts do not have jurisdiction to deliver advisory opinions on
questions that are abstract or hypothetical in nature, so only interested
parties who have an actual controversy are eligible to bring a suit.8 The
term “actual” is one of emphasis rather than of definition, which
means that the controversy should be real in the constitutional sense.9
In other words, the Declaratory Judgment Act requires that actions for
declaratory judgment meet the same test for “case or controversy” as
required for conventional suits under Article III federal jurisdiction.10
Determining whether there is an actual controversy is essential to
deciding whether a party has standing to sue.11
Declaratory judgment actions are frequently used in patent
infringement suits as both shields and swords. Employed as a shield, a
defendant can bring counterclaims for a declaration of invalidity,
unenforceability, and non-infringement. In contrast, when used as a
sword, the declaratory judgment action allows the alleged infringer to
file suit before the patentee brings an infringement action. This can
prevent damages from continuing to accrue and can help businesses
make risk assessments.
The advantages of declaratory judgments for alleged patent
infringers are many. For example, declaratory judgment actions allow
7

Travelers Ins. Co. v. Davis, 490 F.2d 536, 543 (9th Cir. 1974).
Aetna Life Ins. Co. v. Haworth, 300 U.S. 227 (1937).
9
Id. at 239-40.
10
See, e.g., Jennifer R. Saionz, Declaratory Judgment Actions in Patent Cases: The
Federal Circuit's Response to MedImmune v. Genentech, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 161, 161
(2008).
11
However, even if an actual controversy exists, courts still have discretion to
hear declaratory judgment action. But the district court must have a sound basis for
refusing jurisdiction over a declaratory judgment action. See Wilton v. Seven Falls
Co., 515 U.S. 277, 289-90 (1995). See also Elecs. for Imaging, Inc. v. Coyle, 394 F.3d
1341, 1345-46 (Fed. Cir. 2005); Capo, Inc. v. Dioptics Med. Prod., Inc., 387 F.3d
1352, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (“There must be a sound basis for refusing to adjudicate
an actual controversy, for the policy of the Act is to enable resolution of active
disputes.”); Genentech v. Eli Lilly & Co., 998 F.2d 931, 937 (Fed. Cir. 1993)
(“When there is an actual controversy and a declaratory judgment would settle the
legal relations in dispute and afford relief from uncertainty or insecurity, in the usual
circumstance the declaratory action is not subject to dismissal.”).
8
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alleged infringers to eliminate uncertainty regarding potential patent
infringements. In addition, bringing a declaratory judgment action
gives an alleged infringer the opportunity to choose a favorable place
to sue and to control aspects pertaining to litigation such as forum
convenience, potential jury pools, local court rules, trial speed, and
court sophistication regarding patent cases. Finally, declaratory judgment actions allow alleged infringers to better control business risks.
The declaratory judgment action is an equitable remedy. This
means that the court has discretion to decline the declaratory judgment action jurisdiction if it deems appropriate, even if a justiciable
controversy exists.12
II. FROM TWO-PART TO “ALL CIRCUMSTANCES”: HISTORY OF
DECLARATORY JUDGMENT ACTIONS AND SUPREME COURT’S
DECISION IN MEDIMMUNE
The Supreme Court first established the meaning of “actual
controversy” under the Declaratory Judgment Act in Aetna Life
Insurance Co. v. Haworth.13 In Aetna, the Court defined the limitation
of “actual controversy” to mean controversies appropriate for judicial
determination by a court described in Article III of the Constitution.14
The Court stated that “the controversy must be definite and concrete,
12

See, e.g., EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 810 (Fed. Cir. 1996)
(“Even if there is an actual controversy, the district court is not required to exercise
declaratory judgment jurisdiction, but has discretion to decline that jurisdiction.”).
13
Aetna Life, 300 U.S. 227 (1937). In Aetna Life, the declaratory judgment
defendant, Haworth, had purchased life insurance policies from Aetna Life
Insurance Company. The policies provided that upon proof of total and permanent
disability, the insured was no longer required to pay additional premiums, yet the
insurance policies would remain in force. Haworth allegedly ceased payment of
premiums and provided Aetna with documentation of disability. Haworth did not
initiate suit against Aetna or make any threats to do so. Aetna sued Haworth under
the Declaratory Judgment Act, seeking to have the policies declared null and void for
nonpayment.
14
Id. at 239-40 (“The Declaratory Judgment Act of 1934, in its limitation to
‘cases of actual controversy,’ manifestly has regard to the constitutional provision and
is operative only in respect to controversies which are such in the constitutional
sense. The word ‘actual’ is one of emphasis rather than of definition.”).
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touching the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests.”15
Later, in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., the
Supreme Court stated that the presence of an “actual controversy”
within the meaning of the statute depends on “whether the facts
alleged, under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial
controversy, between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient
immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory
judgment.”16
Based on this guidance, the United States Court of Appeals for the
Federal Circuit tried to develop a two-part test to assess whether an
actual controversy exists.17 This dual prong test required: (1) an explicit
threat or other action by the patentee that creates a reasonable
apprehension on the part of the declaratory judgment plaintiff that
they will face an infringement suit (the “reasonable apprehension”
prong) and (2) present activity by the declaratory judgment plaintiff
which could constitute infringement, or concrete steps taken with the
intent to conduct such activity (the “meaningful preparation” prong).18
Under the first element, the defendant’s (patent holder’s) actions
needed to create, in the alleged infringer, a reasonable apprehension of
an infringement suit.19 An express accusation of infringement was
sufficient, but not necessary, to create a reasonable apprehension of
suit.20 For the second element, the plaintiff (alleged infringer) needed
to engage in an activity that would be subject to an infringement
15

Id. at 240-241.
Maryland Casualty Co. v. Pacific Coal & Oil Co., 312 U.S. 270 (1941); see
also Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731 (Fed. Cir.1988);
see also EMC Corp. v. Norand Corp., 89 F.3d 807, 810 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
17
See C.R. Bard, Inc. v. Schwartz, 716 F.2d 874, 879 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (“Courts
have interpreted the controversy requirement in the patent field to generally mean
that the declaratory plaintiff has sufficient interest in the controversy and that there
is a reasonable threat that the patentee or licensor will bring an infringement suit
against the alleged infringer.”).
18
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330, 1339 (Fed.
Cir. 2007); see also Arrowhead Indus. Water, Inc. v. Ecolochem, Inc., 846 F.2d 731,
737 (Fed. Cir. 1988).
19
See Arrowhead 846 F.2d at 736.
20
See Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Releasomers, Inc., 824 F.2d 953, 956
(Fed. Cir. 1987).
16
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accusation or have made “meaningful preparation” for such an
activity.21
In MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., the Supreme Court held that
the Federal Circuit’s two-part test was inconsistent with Supreme
Court precedent, explicitly overruling the “reasonable apprehension”
element of the test and implicitly overruling the second part as well.22
The Supreme Court replaced the Federal Circuit’s formalistic
approach with a “totality of the circumstances” approach that inquires
into the parties’ legal interests to determine whether there is an actual
controversy.23
The Court held that although MedImmune paid royalties to
Genentech to eliminate the risk of an infringement suit, it was not
prohibited from also filing a declaratory judgment action for noninfringement, invalidity, and unenforceability.24 The Supreme Court
reasoned that Article III’s justiciable controversy requirement did not
require an unwilling licensee to risk liability for infringement, with
potential treble damages, before it could obtain a declaration of
actively contested legal rights.25 In short, the plaintiff of a declaratory
judgment action does not have to choose between abandoning a claim
of right and facing the threat of injury.26
Although the Supreme Court did not explicitly overrule both
prongs of the two-part test, the Court indicated in a footnote that the
Federal Circuit’s two-part test conflicted with Supreme Court
precedent.27 Regardless of the Court’s ultimate decision about the two21

See Arrowhead, 846 F.2d at 736.
MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 132 n. 11 (2007). See also
SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., 480 F.3d 1372, 1380 n. 2 (Fed. Cir.
2007) (“We therefore leave to another day the effect of MedImmune, if any, on the
second prong.”).
23
MedImmune, 127 S. Ct. at 771.
24
Id.
25
Id. at 775 (“The rule that a plaintiff must destroy a large building, bet the
farm, or (as here) risk treble damages and the loss of 80 percent of its business before
seeking a declaration of its actively contested legal rights finds no support in Article
III.”).
26
Id. at 772-73.
27
Id. at 774 n. 11.
22
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part test, it was clear from the opinion that the “all circumstances” test
should apply in the future.28 It has, however, taken the Federal Circuit
a number of years to completely abandon the two-prong test and
embrace the “all circumstances” analysis.
III. AFTER MEDIMMUNE: CONFUSION CAUSED BY CONTINUOUS USE
OF ELEMENTS IN THE IMPROPER TWO-PART TEST
After MedImmune, the Federal Circuit initially followed aspects of
the new “all circumstances” test set out by the Supreme Court. But
occasionally the Federal Circuit would continue to apply the traditional two-part test, thereby leading to some confusion because the
Supreme Court had held that test was improper. This confusion,
however, was eventually eliminated by Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Acceleron
LLC, a 2009 Federal Circuit case that clearly follows the “all
circumstances” test of MedImmune. With that decision, the Federal
Circuit signaled to future litigants that the “all circumstances” test will
now be used going forward.
A. Initial Adherence to the “All Circumstances” Test
In SanDisk Corp. v. STMicroelectronics, Inc., the Federal Circuit
considered a dispute between competitors who had entered into
negotiations to cross-license their patents.29 When negotiations began
to break down, SanDisk filed suit, alleging infringement of one of its
patents and seeking a declaratory judgment of non-infringement and
invalidity of the fourteen STMicroelectronics (ST) patents that had
been discussed during the cross-licensing negotiations.30 ST filed a
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district
court granted the motion, holding that no actual case or controversy
28

Id. at 771 (“Basically, the question in each case is whether the facts alleged,
under all the circumstances, show that there is a substantial controversy, between
parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient immediacy and reality to warrant
the issuance of a declaratory judgment.”).
29
SanDisk, 480 F.3d 1372 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
30
Id. at 1376.
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existed under the declaratory judgment action because SanDisk did
not “reasonably apprehend” suit.31
The Federal Circuit reversed. The court determined that it had
jurisdiction in a declaratory judgment action where cross-licensing
negotiations were ongoing.32 Furthermore, the court held that SanDisk
could bring a declaratory judgment action before it received explicit
threats of litigation.33 “[W]here a patentee asserts rights under a patent
based on certain identified ongoing or planned activity of another
party, and where that party contends that it has the right to engage in
the accused activity without license,” the court has jurisdiction over the
action “and the party need not risk a suit for infringement by engaging
in the identified activity before seeking a declaration of its legal
rights.”34 The Federal Circuit observed that this holding was consistent
with MedImmune.35
In addition, the Federal Circuit acknowledged that MedImmune
overruled the “reasonable apprehension” element of the two-part test,36
but the court observed that MedImmune did not address the
“meaningful preparation” element. The Federal Circuit declined to
consider the effect of MedImmune on the second element at that time.37
31

Id.
Id. at 1383.
33
Id. at 1381 (“We hold only that where a patentee asserts rights under a patent
based on certain identified ongoing or planned activity of another party, and where
that party contends that it has the right to engage in the accused activity without
license, an Article III case or controversy will arise and the party need not risk a suit
for infringement by engaging in the identified activity before seeking a declaration of
its legal rights.”).
34
Id. See also Cygnus Therapeutic Sys. v. ALZA Corp., 92 F.3d 1153 (Fed. Cir.
1996) (holding that declaratory judgment jurisdiction was not supported where the
“patentee does nothing more than exercise its lawful commercial prerogatives and, in
so doing, puts a competitor in the position of having to choose between abandoning
a particular business venture or bringing matters to a head by engaging in arguably
infringing activity”).
35
SanDisk, 480 F.3d at 1381-82.
36
Id. at 1380.
37
Id. at 1380 n. 2 (“We therefore leave to another day the effect of MedImmune,
if any, on the second prong.”). The second prong asks whether the plaintiff engaged
in infringing activity or meaningfully prepared to engage in such activity.
32
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In short, the Federal Circuit failed to completely embrace the Supreme
Court’s “all circumstances” test in SanDisk.
That same year, in Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc. v. Novartis
Pharmaceuticals Corp., the Federal Circuit addressed a dispute between
a generic (Teva) and a brand name (Novartis) pharmaceutical
company.38 Unlike SanDisk Corp., however, Teva Pharmaceuticals moved
closer towards the “all circumstances” test.
In Teva Pharmaceuticals, Novartis filed a New Drug Application
(NDA) with the FDA for the drug Famvir and listed five patents
covering the drug: one relating to its composition and four relating to
therapeutic methods.39 Later, Teva filed an Abbreviated New Drug
Application (ANDA) for a generic version of Famvir and certified that
Teva’s drug did not infringe upon Novartis’ patents or that the patents
were invalid.40
Novartis sued Teva for infringement of its composition patent, but
not the method patents.41 In a separate suit, Teva brought a declaratory
judgment action for invalidity and non-infringement of the unasserted
method patents.42 Because Novartis had not taken any actions or made
any threats to enforce the method patents, the district court held that
38

Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., 482 F.3d 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2007).
Teva, 482 F.3d at 1334. The Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act provides
generic pharmaceutical manufacturers with a shortened approval process for
marketing generic drugs. Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act of 1938, Pub. L. No.
75-717, 52 Stat. 1040 (codified as amended at 21 U.S.C. §§ 301-399 (2000 & Supp.
IV 2004)); Drug Price Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984, Pub.
L. No. 98-417, 98 Stat. 1585 (1984) (codified in relevant parts at 21 U.S.C. § 355
and 35 U.S.C. § 271(e) (2000 & Supp. III 2003)).
40
Id. The ANDA filed by generic manufacturers allows utilization of the safety
and efficacy data submitted for the equivalent branded drug’s previously filed NDA.
21 U.S.C. § 355(j) (2000 & Supp. III 2003). As an added incentive to produce
generic drugs, the first company to file an ANDA for a particular drug is granted a
180-day period of market exclusivity before other generic manufacturers may enter
the market. The 180-day period of market exclusivity begins to run either when the
generic drug begins commercial marketing or when a court declares the patent covering the branded drug invalid.
41
Id. at 1334-35.
42
Teva Pharm. USA, Inc. v. Novartis Pharm. Corp., No. 05-2881 JLL, 2005 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 38649 (D. N.J. Dec. 12, 2005).
39
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no justiciable controversy existed and dismissed the case for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction.43
The Federal Circuit looked at the totality of the circumstances
under which Teva had brought suit and reversed the district court,
holding that Teva had a justiciable controversy under the MedImmune
standard.44 The court emphasized that “Novartis created a present and
actual ‘controversy’ by choosing to sue . . . on Teva’s single act of
infringement, thereby placing into actual dispute the soundness of
Teva’s ANDA and Teva’s ability to secure approval of the ANDA.”45
Though the Novartis-initiated suit was a different case from Teva’s
declaratory judgment action, litigation over the composition patent
and the method patents necessarily involved the same technology, the
same parties, and related patents. Thus, the Federal Circuit concluded
that there was a justiciable controversy.46
B. Federal Circuit Still Considers Factors of the Improper Two-Part Test
Although the Federal Circuit began to consider “all circumstances”
in Teva Pharmaceuticals when determining declaratory judgment
jurisdiction, it seems that the traditional two-part test did not
completely disappear. Just a year after the SanDisk and Teva cases, in
2008, the Federal Circuit seemed to resurrect at least part of its twopart test.
In Cat Tech LLC v. TubeMaster, Inc.,47 the Federal Circuit found
that the second prong of “meaningful preparation” was still intact—at
least as a factor used in determining whether a dispute is immediate
and real.
Cat Tech had brought suit against TubeMaster for patent
infringement. TubeMaster counterclaimed, seeking a declaration that
its devices did not infringe Cat Tech’s patent and that the patent was
invalid and unenforceable. Cat Tech subsequently amended its comp43
44
45
46
47

Id. at 9.
Teva, 482 F.3d at 1340.
Id.
Id.
Cat Tech LLC v. TubeMaster, Inc., 528 F.3d 871 (Fed. Cir. 2008),
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laint, seeking a declaratory judgment of infringement.48 The district
court concluded that TubeMaster did not infringe49 so Cat Tech
appealed.
On appeal, the Federal Circuit affirmed, but in doing so seemed to
reinvigorate the “meaningful preparation element.” The Federal
Circuit concluded that although MedImmune articulated a “more
lenient legal standard” for the availability of declaratory judgment
relief in patent cases,50 the issue of whether there has been “meaningful preparation” to conduct potentially infringing activity remains an
important element when considering the “totality of circumstances”
for purposes of the MedImmune test.51 In other words, if a declaratory
judgment plaintiff has not taken significant, concrete steps to conduct
infringing activity, the dispute is neither “immediate” nor “real” and
the requirements for justiciability have not been met.52 In contrast,
from the Federal Circuit’s point of view, the immediacy requirement
for a declaratory judgment could be satisfied if the alleged infringer
took significant, concrete steps to use the potentially infringing design,
like TubeMaster did in this case.53
In addition to Cat Tech, there are two other cases showing that the
Federal Circuit appeared to be retreating from its acceptance of the “all
circumstances” test in Sandisk. In Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex,
Inc.,54 the Federal Circuit required more than speculative fear of harm
to establish that the dispute was “definite and concrete.”55 In Prasco,
LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., the Federal Circuit required the plaintiff
in a declaratory judgment action to show an affirmative act by the

48

Cat Tech, 528 F.3d at 878.
Id.
50
Id. (quoting Micron Tech v. MOSAID Tech., 518 F.3d 897, 902 (Fed. Cir.
2008)).
51
Id. (quoting Teva, 482 F.3d at 1339).
52
Id. (quoting Lang v. Pac. Marine & Supply Co., 895 F.2d 761, 764 (Fed Cir.
1990) (emphasizing that the test for justiciability “looks to the accused infringer’s
conduct and ensures that the controversy is sufficiently real and substantial”)).
53
Cat Tech, 528 F.3d at 882.
54
Janssen Pharmaceutica, N.V. v. Apotex, Inc., 540 F.3d 1353 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
55
Id. at 1362-63.
49
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patentee that demonstrated intent to sue.56 Both of these holdings are
reminiscent of the Federal Circuit’s traditional two-part test.
IV. HEWLETT-PACKARD AND THE FEDERAL CIRCUIT’S RETURN TO
MEDIMMUNE
In 2009, the Federal Circuit once again returned to the “all
circumstances” test, but this time with more conviction. In HewlettPackard Co. v. Acceleron LLC,57 the Federal Circuit held that when
Acceleron, the patent-holder, offered a potential patent license to
Hewlett-Packard without expressly accusing infringement, that contact
was sufficient to give Hewlett-Packard standing to bring a declaratory
judgment action.
Acceleron had contacted Hewlett-Packard on September 14, 2007
to offer a patent license with a two-week deadline for a response.
Acceleron requested an opportunity to discuss the potential license of
a patent recently acquired and asked Hewlett-Packard not to use any
information exchanged in the discussion in any litigation. Two weeks
later, Hewlett-Packard responded by agreeing not to file a declaratory
judgment action for 120 days if Acceleron similarly agreed not to file
an infringement action during the same period. Acceleron then
responded, stating that it did not believe Hewlett-Packard had any
basis for filing a declaratory judgment action. Once again, it imposed a
two-week period for Hewlett-Packard to accept the patent license offer.
On October 17th, Hewlett-Packard filed a declaratory judgment
suit in the District Court for the District of Delaware. Acceleron
moved to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On March 11,
2009, the district court granted Acceleron’s motion, based on the
following factual filings: (1) Acceleron never proposed a confidentiality
agreement, and (2) Acceleron never accepted Hewlett-Packard’s 120day -standstill proposal and never provided a counter-proposal or other
assurance it would not sue Hewlett-Packard. Hewlett-Packard appealed
the dismissal of its declaratory judgment action.
56

Prasco, L.L.C. v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1338 (Fed. Cir.

2008).
57

Hewlett-Packard Co. v. Acceleron LLC, 587 F.3d 1358 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
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On appeal, the Federal Circuit reversed the dismissal after holding
a declaratory judgment action cannot be defeated simply by using a
correspondence that “avoids the magic words such as ‘litigation’ or
‘infringement.’”58 The Federal Circuit further recognized that it is
implausible (especially after MedImmune and several post-MedImmune
decisions) to expect that a competent lawyer drafting such correspondence for a patent owner would identify specific claims, present
claim charts, and explicitly allege infringement.59
On the other hand, the court noted that a communication from a
patent owner to another party that merely identifies its patent and the
other party’s product line, without more communications, cannot
establish adverse legal interests between the parties, let alone the
existence of a “definite and concrete” dispute. More communication is
required to establish declaratory judgment jurisdiction.60
The Federal Circuit noted that the test for declaratory judgment
jurisdiction in patent cases is objective.61 Indeed, it is the objective
words and actions of the patent holder that are controlling.62 Thus,
conduct that can be reasonably inferred as demonstrating intent to
enforce a patent can create declaratory judgment jurisdiction.
The Federal Circuit further observed that Acceleron was solely a
licensing entity, and without enforcement it received no benefits from
its patents.63 In the Federal Circuit’s view, this added significance to
the fact that Acceleron refused Hewlett-Packard’s request for a mutual
standstill—and such a limited standstill is distinguishable from a
covenant not to sue.64
The facts of this case, when viewed objectively and in totality,
showed to the Federal Circuit’s satisfaction that Acceleron took the
58

Id.
Id.
60
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affirmative step of twice contacting Hewlett-Packard directly and
making an implied assertion of its patent right against HewlettPackard. In other words, Acceleron did not directly accuse HewlettPackard of patent infringement, but it did (1) indicate that its patents
were “relevant” to Hewlett-Packard products, (2) insist that HewlettPackard’s response must come within two weeks, and (3) ask HewlettPackard not to file a declaratory judgment action. Thus, the Federal
Circuit held that it is reasonable for Hewlett-Packard to interpret
Acceleron’s letters as implicitly asserting its patent rights under the
circumstances,65 and Hewlett-Packard was eligible to bring a
declaratory judgment action.
The Hewlett-Packard decision is important because the Federal
Circuit confirmed again—and, hopefully, once and for all—that the “all
circumstances” test should be applied to determine jurisdiction over
declaratory judgment actions.66 It is also noteworthy that Federal
Circuit considered that a patentee is “solely a licensing entity, and
without enforcement it receives no benefits from its patents.”67 This
signals that the Federal Court may treat patent holders who actually
sell patented products more favorably than patent holding entities who
only license patents.
V. IMPLICATION OF HEWLETT-PACKARD—“ALL CIRCUMSTANCES” TEST
CONFIRMED & PATENT HOLDING ENTITIES BEWARE
The Hewlett-Packard case confirms that the Federal Circuit will
apply the “all circumstances” test in determining whether an actual
controversy exists to satisfy the standing requirement for declaratory
judgment actions by alleged infringers during licensing negotiation. An
actual controversy occurs when the patent holder and the alleged
infringer have different opinions about whether accused products fall
within the scope of the patents. Patent holders should therefore
consider the risk of facing a declaratory judgment action if adverse
65
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Id. (”Our decision in this case undoubtedly marks a shift from past declaratory
judgment cases”).
67
Id.
66
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opinions form during licensing negotiations. Patentees may want to
arrange certain nondisclosure agreements (NDAs) between parties
prior to the licensing negotiation. Although NDAs may not completely
prevent the alleged infringer from bringing declaratory judgment
actions, they may provide a contractual basis for a remedy if the
accused infringer discloses materials in further declaratory judgment
actions.
Another strategy would be for patentees to bring an infringement
suit before initiating the licensing negotiation. The patentee can
generally file a complaint first without serving the accused infringer to
allow both parties to have a chance to negotiate a possible license. By
doing so, the patentees can still choose favorable fora and enjoy the
advantages of primacy and memorability in litigation.
Patent holding companies should expect that the courts will take
into consideration that such companies generally license their patents
rather than using them in other ways. The Federal Circuit reasoned
that because licensing is how patent holding companies use their
patents, the “actual controversy” occurs more easily when adverse
positions are formed during licensing negotiation. If the patentee is a
holding company, which means that patentee can only enforce the
patent right by licensing, that status is also a factor to consider when
determining declaratory judgment jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Hewlett-Packard signaled the Federal Circuit’s decision to finally
embrace the “all circumstances” test from MedImmune in determining
whether there is an actual controversy to establish standing for a
declaratory judgment action over patent infringement. Communication merely identifying patents and products is insufficient to establish
adverse legal interests or an actual controversy. Instead, the courts will
consider all circumstances under an objective standard to determine
whether there is a declaratory judgment jurisdiction. If the patentee is
a holding company, the courts may more easily find a sufficient
controversy exists over a licensing negotiation. On the other hand, the
courts still have discretion whether to hear a declaratory judgment
action case even if the actual controversy element is met. To preserve
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the advantage of choosing favorable fora, it is recommended that
patentees bring any applicable infringement suit before initiating
license negotiations.
PRACTICE POINTERS


Patentees should avoid ultimatums or strict deadlines during
license negotiation. During the license negotiation, the patentee
should be aware that the accused infringer might use every
correspondence and communication as evidence to show actual
controversy between the parties. Demands for responses within
specific timeframes could suggest a sufficient controversy has
arisen.



Patentees should avoid disclosing patents not intended. Patentees
should not disclose unrelated patents during license negotiation
because such disclosure may create a basis for the accused infringer
to bring a declaratory judgment action against that unrelated
patent.



Patentees should consider executing nondisclosure agreements
(NDAs). Before any license negotiation, both parties should
consider executing a NDA to prevent disclosure of any
communication during negotiation. Such an agreement may not
effectively prevent the accused infringers from bringing declaratory
judgment actions, but the NDA could provide a contractual basis
for possible damage claims if one party breaches.



Patentees should consider bringing suit before license negotiation.
Based on the modern “all circumstances” test, it is easier for
accused infringers to bring a declaratory judgment action than
before. To preserve the advantages of choosing favorable fora,
patentees may want to bring an infringement suit before license
negotiations.



Patentees should challenge, on equitable grounds, declaratory
judgment claims brought during negotiations. Patentees should
consider asking courts to decline jurisdiction if an alleged infringer
files a declaratory judgment action during licensing negotiations.
Since a declaratory judgment action is an equitable remedy, the
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court can decline jurisdiction if it perceives the alleged infringer
filed the action just to gain leverage in the licensing negotiation.


Patentees should negotiate penalty clauses in license agreements.
Patentees should include penalty clauses in license agreements that
are triggered by any attack on the patent. Possible penalties could
include an automatic increase in royalty rates, liquidated damages,
or termination of the license.

